|Apache Struts 2 Documentation > Home > Security Bulletins > S2-003|
XWork ParameterInterceptors bypass allows OGNL statement execution
|Who should read this||All Struts 2 developers|
|Impact of vulnerability||Remote server context manipulation|
|Maximum security rating||Critical|
|Recommendation||Developers should immediately upgrade to Struts 2.0.12 or upgrade to XWork 2.0.6|
|Affected Software||Struts 2.0.0 - Struts 22.214.171.124|
|Original JIRA Ticket||XW-641, WW-2692|
|Reporter||Meder Kydyraliev, Google Security Team|
OGNL provides, among other features, extensive expression evaluation capabilities (http://www.ognl.org/2.6.9/Documentation/html/LanguageGuide/expressionEvaluation.html). The vulnerability allows a malicious user to bypass the '#'-usage protection built into the ParametersInterceptor, thus being able to manipulate server side context objects.
So, for instance, to set #session.user to '0wn3d' the following parameter name can be used:
('\u0023' + 'session[\'user\']')(unused)=0wn3d
which will look as follows once URL encoded:
As of XWork 2.0.5, being part of the Struts 126.96.36.199 release, the ParameterInterceptor was changed to provide a whitelist mechanism for acceptable, non malicious parameter names. Therefore, in the example above, the given parameter will be ignored. Nevertheless there are still cases where the whitelist mechanism does not prevent the context from being manipulated, thus XWork 2.0.5 and Struts 188.8.131.52 do not fix the issue satisfactorily.
As of XWork 2.0.6, being part of the Struts 2.0.12 release, the ParametersInterceptor applies stack changes to a copy of the original value stack, for which context parameters which might be subject to manipulations are cleared beforehand.
You can either obtain a copy of the released XWork 2.0.6 jar as a drop in replacement for the XWork 2.0.4 / 2.0.5 jar used in Struts 2.0.9 and above, or download a full release of Struts 2.0.12, which contains the corrected XWork library.